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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20080377-CA
vs.
KIDUS YOHANNES,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

The State Failed to Prove a Sufficient Nexus Between Yohannes and the
Financial Card to Show Control and Intent Under Utah Code Annotated §
76-6-506.3 (2003)
"To find that a defendant had constructive possession of ... contraband, it is

necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the
[contraband] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over the [contraband]." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985). In State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32, 122 P.3d 639, the Utah Supreme
Court listed several factors that "may be important in determining whether the nexus in a
particular case is sufficient, including ownership and/or occupancy of the residence or
vehicle where the [contraband was] found, defendant's proximity to the [contraband]...

incriminating statements or behavior, presence of [contraband] in a specific area where
the defendant had control, etc."
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also issued a caveat about "mechanically
relying on a list of factors ... ." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911.
Moreover, these factors are "not 'universally pertinent,' and ... 'no such list is
exhaustive, and that listed factors are only considerations.'" Workman, 2005 UT at f 32
(quoting Layman, 1999 UT at f 14-15). Whether there is a sufficient nexus "depends on
the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Yohannes asserts that
in this case this Court should consider the evidence "within the totality of the
circumstances presented[,]" State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1998), and
"whether there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the [financial card] to
permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise
control over the [financial card]." Layman, 1999 UT at^[ 15 (emphasis added). In
addition, "although circumstantial evidence may be enough to prove constructive
possession, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Yohannes] committed each element of the crime charged." Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999
UT App 61,110, 975 P.2d 501 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah
1993)).
A. Insufficient evidence existed at trial to prove Yohannes had dominion and
control over the financial card
The State relies on some of the factors used in State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f
2

32, 122 P.3d 639, to determine whether a sufficient nexus existed between Yohannes and
the financial card (Appellee Br. at 8-9). The State claims that the debit card's presence in
Yohannes's locked vehicle is significant (Appellee Br. at 9). When isolated, the fact that
the debit card was found in Yohannes's locked vehicle is suggestive, but alone is
insufficient. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (holding that "[ownership
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although important
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when
occupancy is not exclusive."). Here, any number of persons had access to Yohannes's
vehicle, especially because his keys were missing (R. 149: 121) and the vehicle was not
secured and was accessible through the sunroof (R. 149: 99-100).
Furthermore, the State erroneously claims that "[njothing in the record suggests
that any person other than the defendant has access to and control over the car ..."
(Appellee Br. at 9). It is undisputed in the record that Yohannes's keys were missing (R.
149: 121) and mysteriously reappeared only after Westfahl discovered them in one of
Yohannes's bags (R. 149: 122). Furthermore, the investigating officer testified that
because the sunroof was not fully secured a person could get into the vehicle without
keys (R. 149: 99-100). Clearly, during this time any number of people could have had
access to Yohannes' car.
Also, the State claims that because Yohannes may have suspected Westfahl of
vandalizing his computer and taking his car keys, an inference of constructive possession
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exists. The State's analysis is misplaced. Even if Yohannes was "enraged" about the
situation, this behavior is not incriminating to the point that one could reasonably infer
that Yohannes had control over the card. See, State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah
1985) (citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant nodded
affirmatively when introduced as owner of cocaine)). In fact, there was no evidence
introduced at trial that Yohannes had made any incriminating statements about the debit
card. See Bryan, 99 UT App 61 at f 9 (A factor weighing against conviction in a
constructive possession case based on circumstantial evidence was that "defendant made
no statements, incriminating or otherwise").
Finally, and most importantly, the State presented no evidence that Yohannes
either possessed or attempted to use the financial card. At trial, the State stipulated to the
fact that fingerprints were indeed found on the financial card, but they did not belong to
Yohannes (Stipulated Exhibit #3). Furthermore, no evidence was presented that
Yohannes either used or attempted to use the financial card.
Under Layman, this Court should consider all the evidence "within the totality of
the circumstances presented." Layman, 953 P.2d at 789. In light of the facts as presented
above, there is an "[in]sufficient nexus between the accused and the [financial card] to
permit an inference" that Yohannes had the power to exercise control over it. State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).

B. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Yohannes intended to use
the debit card in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-503.2 (2007)
"Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d
316, 319 (Utah 1985). Accord State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1986).
Here, the State argues that because Yohannes may have been upset with Westfahl
because he suspected him of causing $100 damage to his computer, there is a reasonable
inference that Yohannes took the card without permission in order to use it to repair the
damage (Appellee Br. at 10-12). While that is a possible inference, it is insufficient to
establish intent.
Other facts overcome the speculation that Yohannes possessed the card with intent
to use it. First, evidence showed that Yohannes probably did not possess the card. When
the card was retrieved by police a fingerprint was found on it, but not Yohannes'
(Stipulated Exhibit #3). This indicates that if he never "possessed" it, he could not have
intended to use it. Second, evidence showed that the debit card was never used (R. 149:
136). From the time Westfahl discovered his card missing, June 4th or 5th to the time
officers seized the card on June 8th there was sufficient time for Yohannes to have
allegedly used the card (R. 149: 115-16; 128; 149: 91-92). Together, these facts
overcome any perceived possibility or conjecture that Yohannes intended to use the card.
See Layman, 953 P.2d at 792. The State presented no evidence to show that the card was
5

used or that there was even an attempt to use it.
By this logic, even absurd factual situations could result in a conviction of Utah
Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003). For example, imagine a man has just taken a woman out for
dinner and a movie. At the conclusion of the date, when he is dropping his date off at
home, her credit card accidentally falls from her purse onto the floor of his car.
Disillusioned by the date, the man returns to his apartment and shares his regret with his
roommates, calling the date a waste of time and stating that he would like his money
back. The next day, on his way to work, this man finds the woman's credit card and
places it in his glove compartment for safe keeping until he can return it. The woman,
panicked about her missing card, suspects that maybe the man from her date took it. If
police found the card in the man's possession and were privy of his statements about him
wanting his money back, under the State's logic, this would be sufficient to convict him
of unlawful possession of a financial card. This would be a considerable stretch to
conclude that the man had control and intended to use the card. Here too it would be
unreasonable to find that, under the totality of the circumstances, a person could find a
sufficient nexus between Yohannes and the financial card to show that he had control and
intended to use the card. See Utah Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003).
Furthermore, even if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient, it was only
sufficient to prove motive to obtain the card, not intent to use the card. "Motive describes
the reason a person chooses to commit a crime. The reason, however, is different from a
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required mental state such as intent or malice." People v. Hillhouse, 27 Cal.4th 469, 504,
40 P.3d 754 (Cal. 2002). See also State v. Rosales, 136 N.M. 25, 30, 94 P.3d 768 (N.M.
2004) ("Motive ... is the inducement which impels or leads the mind to indulge in a
criminal act."); State v. Yarbrough, 210 P.3d 1029, 1038 (Wash Ct. App. 2009)
("[M]otive is not synonymous with intent. Intent is the mental state with which the
criminal act is committed. Motive is an inducement which tempts a mind to commit a
crime.") (internal citations omitted).
Here, the facts set forth by the State were merely proof of motive, not intent, and
therefore are insufficient to prove intent to use a financial card. The State claims that
Yohannes suspected his roommate to have (1) sabotaged his computer; and (2) taken his
car keys, which cost Yohannes money to repair and replace (Appellee Br. at 10-12).
Even if the State's hypothesis were true and Yohannes did believe that his roommate had
damaged his computer and taken his keys, Yohannes' frustration demonstrates only
motive to use the financial card, not intent as required under Utah Code § 76-6-503.3
(2003). This evidence merely describes why Yohannes would want to take the financial
card; intent, however, requires something different. Evidence at trial never demonstrated
an intent to use the financial card. In fact, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion:
Yohannes' fingerprints were never found on the card and there was no evidence
presented that the card was ever used. Because the trial evidence was proof of motive
and not intent, the second prong of the analysis necessarily fails, thus creating a
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significant deficiency in evidence and a reasonable doubt as to Yohannes' guilt.
As this Court concluded in Layman, "any significant deficiency in evidence
establishing the nexus almost always leaves room for those 'reasonable hypothes[es] of
innocence' which 'necessarily raise[ ] a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.'"
Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 792 (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)). Here,
the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Yohannes (1) possessed the
debit card; and (2) intended to use it. Accordingly, "the necessary nexus between [him]
and the [transaction card] does not exist... [and] neither possibilities nor probabilities can
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at f 10. As
such, this Court should reverse Yohannes' conviction on the ground of insufficient
evidence.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Yohannes asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession
or transfer of a financial transaction card.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of September, 2009.

MARGARET P. LII
Counsel for Appellant
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